

63-4166

✓ February 1963

The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Dean:

Attached for your information is a "Position Paper on Cuba" handed to me by Senator Keating yesterday afternoon with the request that I transmit it to the President, which I did after my meeting with the Senator.

It is my understanding that Mr. Bundy will communicate with you in regard to this matter.

Yours very truly,

Signed

John A. McCone
Director

Attachment

STAT

[Redacted]

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PAPER HANDED TO DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BY SENATOR KENNETH KEATING, FEBRUARY 9, 1963

POSITION PAPER ON CUBA

POLICY OBJECTIVES:

1. Removal of all Soviet-bloc forces, weapons and other military equipment from Cuba.
2. Prevention of spread of communism from Cuba to other points.
3. Downfall of communist regime and its replacement by a freely elected constitutional government.

PREMISES:

1. The maintenance of a Soviet military base in Cuba is a threat to world peace and its removal by any means short of war would enhance prospects for world peace.
2. Communist activities in Cuba pose a special danger to the stability of the Western Hemisphere, the security of the Guantanamo base and the Panama Canal, and the reliability of launching and communications facilities at Cape Canaveral.
3. The Russians will not remove their forces, weapons, or equipment from Cuba unless the burden of their maintenance is made intolerable.

4. The United States and the OAS have the right and obligation to require the removal of any foreign controlled military bases from the Western Hemisphere.

POLICY:

1. Provide full information with regard to the nature of the menace provided by the continued existence of a Soviet-bloc military base in Cuba. Discard the sharp distinction between offensive and defensive weapons and emphasize that the presence of Soviet Migs, torpedo boats, tanks, missiles and other equipment in Cuba cannot be tolerated. Make it clear that in the absence of on-site inspection, it is impossible to obtain adequate assurance that nuclear weapons are not in or will not be brought into Cuba.

2. Embark upon an effective and increasingly severe program of economic sanctions along the following lines:

A. Enlarge existing executive order so that no ships supplying Castro can carry United States non-governmental cargo.

B. Deny access to U.S. ports and cargoes for any ship of any line which supplies Cuba.

C. Deny access to U.S. ports and cargoes of the ships of any country whose ships are supplying any goods or equipment to Cuba.

D. Initiate OAS regulations to provide that no ships supplying Cuba may pick up return cargoes in other Latin American countries.

E. Initiate NATO regulations to provide that no ships supplying Cuba may pick up cargoes in other NATO countries.

F. Deny U.S. ports to any country providing refueling services to ships carrying goods and equipment to Cuba.

G. Deny U.S. non-military aid to any country providing refueling services to ships carrying goods and equipment to Cuba.

H. Initiate OAS embargo on imports from Cuba.

I. Establish mobile OAS inspection teams to check all ships and planes arriving in Latin America from Cuba.

J. Cut off sales to the Soviet bloc of any goods or equipment of a type which the Soviet bloc is supplying to Cuba.

K. Initiate a Free World boycott of Cuban goods.

L. Initiate further restrictions on Free World trade with Soviet bloc.

M. Initiate ban on flights between Cuba and Free World countries.

If these are insufficient:

N. Institute quarantine on shipments by Soviet bloc or any other countries of any military equipment to Cuba.

O. Institute quarantine on shipments by Soviet bloc or any other countries of any petroleum shipments to Cuba.

3. Simultaneously with the application of these economic sanctions, steps should be taken to increase the effectiveness of anti-communist propaganda inside Cuba, to infiltrate Castro agencies, to encourage guerrilla activities, and to block Castro-inspired terrorism in Latin America.

CONCLUSION:

Only a firm and determined policy can force the Soviets out of Cuba. The actions recommended are severe, but not as drastic as other alternatives such as a military invasion. The longer such steps are delayed the more difficult it will be to defeat the communist drive in the Western Hemisphere. Risks are involved in any effort to dislodge Soviet forces from Cuba, but there is an even greater risk of all-out war if we do nothing.

Most difficult aspect of policy recommended will be to obtain understanding and cooperation of other Free World countries. This will be possible only if the U.S. effectively dramatizes dangers to world peace inherent in the present situation. Any attempt to minimize or downgrade the threat which exists will make it impossible to generate the united action and determination essential to success.